The United Kingdom’s decision to sanction Rosneft and Lukoil, Russia’s two largest oil companies, is not merely an economic strike. It is the reopening of a geopolitical front, one that may not hit Moscow immediately, but is increasingly designed to corner major buyers of Russian crude, particularly India. While UK insists its sanctions are aimed only at weakening Russia’s wartime revenue streams, senior British officials have now openly acknowledged what was previously implied: the next wave of pressure is directed at countries that continue to purchase and refine Russian oil without aligning with Western embargo lines. In India, this is not interpreted as energy policy. It is interpreted as strategic signalling.
A Sanction Aimed at Moscow: But Felt in New Delhi
UK Chancellor Rachel Reeves, during a recent visit to the United States, stated:
“We are ramping up pressure on companies in third countries that facilitate the flow of Russian oil into global markets.”
(Reuters, Washington Briefing)
Although she did not name India directly, British media and policy advisers have repeatedly highlighted India’s continued intake of Russian oil as a “workaround” sustaining Moscow’s revenues. According to Bloomberg Intelligence, India has become the largest seaborne buyer of Russian crude since 2022, capitalising on steep discounts following Western embargoes.
By targeting Rosneft and Lukoil, London is indirectly complicating operations for Nayara Energy, the Indian refinery in Gujarat in which Rosneft holds a 49.13% equity stake. The refinery, formerly Essar Oil, refines over 20 million tonnes of crude annually, a significant throughput in India’s private sector energy grid. This is the real pressure point: London cannot sanction India, but it can tighten the screws on assets India depends on.
What the Sanctions Actually Do
The UK sanctions list includes:
- Complete asset freezes on Rosneft and Lukoil-linked entities
- Bans on British services for Russian oil shipping, including insurance and finance
- Blacklisting of 44 so-called “shadow fleet” tankers, alleged to be transporting sanctioned Russian crude
Insurance is the real weapon. British marine insurers cover nearly 60% of global shipping. By choking access to insurance, London can make it riskier and costlier for vessels carrying Russian crude, regardless of buyer nationality, to dock anywhere. The sanctions are designed not to stop oil from moving, but to raise the friction cost of buying it.
Why India Is at the Centre Without Being Named
India continues to defend its purchases of Russian crude as a matter of national energy security. With domestic inflation and fuel sensitivity, India has consistently argued that discounted crude from Russia supports internal price stability. A senior Indian foreign policy official, quoted anonymously in The Hindu’s diplomatic bureau, stated:
“Strategic autonomy is not seasonal. We cannot be asked to choose between affordability and alignment.”
This is not merely rhetoric. It is doctrine. Even as Western leaders have informally urged India to reduce Russian imports, India’s monthly purchase volumes have shown no consistent decline. Data from Vortexa & Kpler shows that India imported nearly 1.5–1.7 million barrels per day of Russian crude in mid-2024, more than triple pre-war levels.
The Real Issue: Rosneft’s Indian Footprint
India’s problem is not that it buys Russian oil. It is that a Russian state firm partially owns Indian refining infrastructure. Rosneft’s stake in Nayara Energy forms the sharpest edge of British sanctions. While Nayara is not sanctioned directly, experts warn of “liability risk” through association.
Energy analyst Chris Weafer (Macro-Advisory, Moscow) noted:
“London will not sanction India. But it can make Indian refiners uncomfortable by raising compliance flags around Russian equity participation.”
If financial institutions become wary of dealing with entities tied to sanctioned firms, Nayara could face higher borrowing costs, restricted dollar transactions, or shipping challenges. This is how pressure builds silently.
London’s Strategy: From Appeal to Coercion
This move by the UK is part of a broader evolution in Western strategy. Early in the war, the West requested India limit Russian imports. Then came tariff threats under former U.S. President Donald Trump. Now, we are entering a stage of systemic restriction, where third-party nations are no longer spared from secondary consequences.
What makes it more significant is timing. Trump recently claimed PM Modi had assured the U.S. that India would end its Russian oil purchases, a statement unconfirmed by New Delhi. The UK’s sanctions, coming days later, are seen by some analysts as a tightening of Western consensus headed into a new geopolitical cycle.
“This is the phase where the West is no longer debating India’s position, it is testing it,”
said Prof. Harsh Pant (ORF) in a StratNews interview.
India’s Response: Freedom to Choose, Freedom to Buy
India has maintained a consistent position on oil- it will buy from wherever it secures the “best terms”. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has repeatedly emphasised this, most notably in Brussels in 2023:
“Europe bought more Russian gas in one afternoon than India did in several months. So if there is morality here, it must be universal.”
This quote has become a diplomatic shield every time the West criticises India. India has not condemned the UK move, but neither has it shifted posture. Within the Indian establishment, the UK sanctions are seen not as a direct threat, but as part of a long game to tie India more closely to the Western order, especially ahead of any future U.S.-led negotiation blocs.
The Risk Matrix: What Could Happen Next
| Scenario | Impact on India |
|---|---|
| Marine Insurance Tightening | Tankers to India face higher coverage costs |
| Sanctions on Ship Brokers | Disruptions in delivery contracts |
| Escalation to EU Coordination | Pressure through combined UK-EU compliance systems |
| U.S. Alignment with UK Strategy | Possible expansion into G7-wide measures |
India’s Ministry of Petroleum has already begun informal consultations with insurers in Dubai and Singapore, a sign that the government is preparing alternative backchannels to bypass London-based institutions.
What Analysts Are Warning About
European think tank Bruegel recently noted:
“India is not complicit in Russian aggression, but it has become structurally embedded in Russia’s oil resilience.”
This is exactly the line that sanctions policy now aims to target- not the war economy, but the buyers’ ecosystem. Meanwhile, Moscow has issued its own warning. A state energy spokesman, reported by TASS, declared:
“Western sanctions will not stop Russian exports. They will only fracture the trading system further.”
Strategic Autonomy: India’s Red Line
For India, this is about more than energy. It is the defence of a principle: Strategic Autonomy, born in the Non-Aligned Movement, hardened during U.S. sanctions on post-nuclear India, and redefined during the Ukraine war. India will adjust volumes, shift routes, even settle in rupees or dirhams, but it will not accept external diktats on sourcing. Any public concession will be seen as loss of sovereignty.
Dr. C. Raja Mohan, writing in The Indian Express, noted:
“India wants partnerships- not patronage. The West must understand the difference.”
A New Phase in Global Oil Diplomacy
The UK’s sanctions are a preview, not a culmination. In this emerging order, oil supply is no longer just a market question, it is an instrument of alignment. By pressuring Rosneft-linked assets, London has placed India in a diplomatic balance test.
India will not abandon Russia lightly. Not because of loyalty, but necessity. Discounted crude, refinery economics, and strategic leverage drive its decision. But as Western sanction engines expand from punishment to persuasion, the contradictions between energy pragmatism and global politics will grow sharper. This is no longer about whether India buys Russian oil.
It is about whether the world accepts India’s right to decide
