Here’s why the Taliban-Deoband Bonhomie should worry India

In October 2025, India marked a major step in reengaging with Afghanistan when Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited New Delhi—the first senior Taliban visit since 2021. During his trip on October 10, India announced the upgrade of its Kabul mission to a full-fledged embassy.

India’s renewed engagement with Afghanistan reflects pragmatic realpolitik, leveraging strained Taliban-Pakistan relations—marked by mutual accusations and Pakistani airstrikes—to reduce Islamabad’s influence and strengthen India’s regional foothold. India’s renewed engagement marks a cautious, tactical reset—restoring diplomatic presence in Kabul without granting formal recognition—placing it alongside countries like China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkiye that maintain full embassies there. 

The Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi received a warm welcome from clergy and students, meeting seminary leaders like Maulana Arshad Madani. He called Deoband the “spiritual home” of the Taliban and expressed hopes for stronger India-Afghanistan ties. Critics, including Javed Akhtar, condemned the reception given the Taliban’s human rights record, while Deoband representatives denied supporting extremism. The event has sparked debate over historical links between Deobandi institutions and the Taliban, echoing past accusations by leaders like UP CM Yogi Adityanath.

The Taliban-Deoband Bonhomie and concerns for India

The October 2025 Taliban-Deoband interactions and the support the Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi received in the sleepy town of Deoband raise three principal concerns for India:

1. Erosion of Women’s Rights and Social Liberalism – Taliban-inspired conservatism could embolden restrictive practices within Indian Muslim communities, undermining gender equality, girls’ education, and progressive voices, while reinforcing stereotypes of Muslims as regressive.

2. Radicalization and Security Risks – Deoband’s ideological links to the Taliban may inspire youth radicalization, sympathy for militancy, or homegrown extremism, raising concerns about terrorism, cross-border threats, and narratives like Ghazwa-e-Hind.

3. Communal Polarization and Geopolitical Contradictions – The event fuels Hindu-Muslim tensions, electoral and societal polarization, and exposes a disconnect between India’s pragmatic Taliban engagement and its stated liberal-democratic values, potentially hampering Muslim integration and reform efforts.

History of Deoband

The Deobandi movement, a Sunni revivalist tradition within the Hanafi school, arose in late 19th-century British India to counter colonial influence and revive Islamic scholarship. Founded in 1866 with the establishment of Darul Uloom Deoband in Uttar Pradesh by Muhammad Qasim Nanautavi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, it sought to preserve Islamic education and culture after the 1857 revolt and the decline of Muslim power. Inspired by Shah Waliullah’s reformist ideas, the seminary emphasized Quran, Hadith, and Fiqh, maintaining independence from British control through public donations.

The Deobandi movement advocates a return to pure Islamic teachings, rejecting syncretic and folk practices while upholding a disciplined form of Sufism within Hanafi orthodoxy. Founded on Quranic and Hadith-based education, it emphasized moral reform and scholarly leadership over direct political confrontation, though many Deobandis later joined India’s independence struggle.

Expanding rapidly in the 20th century, it inspired thousands of madrasas and offshoots like the global Tablighi Jamaat. After 1947, its influence spread across Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, shaping religious and political thought—most notably influencing, but not limited to, the Taliban. Today, Darul Uloom Deoband remains a major Islamic institution, its legacy blending revivalism, education, and global outreach.

Origins of the Taliban

The Taliban, meaning “students” in Pashto, emerged in early 1990s Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal and civil war. Originating from Pashtun regions, it comprised former mujahideen and students from Deobandi-influenced Pakistani madrasas. Founded by Mullah Mohammed Omar and Abdul Ghani Baradar, the group was backed by Pakistan’s ISI and funded by Saudi Arabia. Promising to end warlord corruption and enforce Sharia law, the Taliban gained early support in Pashtun areas. 

The Taliban’s ideology combines Deobandi Islamic fundamentalism, Pashtunwali tribal code, and strict Hanafi Sharia, emphasizing religious purity, rejection of Western influence, and rigid social control. Founded by Mullah Omar, who declared himself Amir al-Mu’minin in 1996, the group enforced harsh laws, banned women’s education, and committed atrocities during its first rule (1996–2001), when it controlled most of Afghanistan until being toppled by the U.S. after 9/11.

Regrouping in Pakistan, the Taliban waged a 20-year insurgency, eventually regaining power in August 2021 after the U.S. withdrawal. Since then, they have reinstated repressive policies, especially against women, amid economic collapse, internal rifts, and ongoing conflict with ISIS-K. Despite limited recognition (notably by Russia in 2025), the regime remains internationally isolated, symbolizing Afghanistan’s enduring struggle between religious authoritarianism and modern statehood.

Commonality between the Deobandis and the Taliban

The Taliban’s ideology stems directly from Deobandi Islam—a conservative Sunni revivalist movement within the Hanafi school founded in 19th-century India. Both emphasize returning to the pure practices of early Islam through strict adherence to Sharia. Many Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar, were educated in Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan, where their beliefs were shaped during the Soviet-Afghan War. While Deobandis focus on studying and interpreting Islamic law, the Taliban enforce it through governance, often with extreme rigidity. 

India maintained strong ties with Afghanistan from 2002 to 2021, investing nearly $3 billion in reconstruction and aligning with anti-Taliban forces like the Northern Alliance. Viewing the Taliban as a Pakistani proxy—especially after the 1999 Kandahar hijacking and the 2008 Kabul embassy bombing—India supported the Karzai and Ghani governments. After the Taliban’s 2021 return, India evacuated its diplomats, shut consulates, and suspended formal engagement, seeing the takeover as a major setback to its strategic and security interests.

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Since 2021, India has adopted a pragmatic approach toward Afghanistan, focusing on humanitarian aid, including medical and food assistance, and using Iran’s Chabahar port to bypass Pakistan for trade. Following the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, India allowed Afghan trucks entry via Attari as a goodwill gesture. On May 15, 2025, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar held the first high-level call with Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, signaling cautious engagement after the Taliban condemned the attack and refuted Pakistan’s claims about Indian missiles in Afghanistan.

India’s sophisticated, indirect strategic manoeuvre is reminiscent of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War principles. The strategy proposes leveraging Darul Uloom Deoband as a global center of Deobandi influence to subtly reshape Taliban ideology in line with Indian democratic norms, countering Salafi-jihadist threats, and reducing Pakistani and Saudi sway. Inspired by Sun Tzu’s principles of subduing the enemy without fighting, it relies on alliances, ideological influence, and long-term positioning rather than direct confrontation. Success depends on India’s ability to navigate complex religious diplomacy and manage domestic radicalization risks.

India’s Capabilities: Strengths and Evidence

India possesses significant strengths in diplomacy, intelligence, and counter-radicalization that could support indirect influence over the Taliban through Darul Uloom Deoband. Diplomatically, India engages the Taliban pragmatically without formal recognition, leveraging aid, trade, and cultural ties, while potentially promoting “theological diplomacy” through exchanges and programs at Deoband to guide Taliban ideology toward moderation and diminish Pakistani influence.

In terms of intelligence and surveillance, agencies such as RAW and the IB have a strong track record of monitoring radical networks, managing both digital and offline threats, and countering external jihadist influences, enabling careful oversight of Deobandi-Taliban interactions. Domestically, India has addressed internal radicalization through madrassa reforms, interfaith initiatives, and youth engagement, mitigating Wahhabi and jihadist influence and demonstrating the ability to co-opt conservative Islamic institutions like Deoband for broader regional influence while minimizing security risks.

Limitations and Risks: Why It Might Falter

India’s strategy to influence the Taliban through Darul Uloom Deoband faces several significant challenges. Persistent radicalization, fueled by Wahhabi and Pan-Islamist influences in regions such as Kashmir, Kerala, and other pockets, continues to shape youth through madrassas, social media, and high unemployment, fostering domestic sympathy for Taliban-style ideologies.

The approach also carries high-stakes risks and potential blowback: engaging Deoband could exacerbate internal polarization, deepen ideological divisions, and damage India’s reputation if the Taliban fail to comply with human rights norms, necessitating intensive surveillance to avoid creating a “Frankenstein” scenario. Furthermore, geopolitical constraints—India’s domestic focus on Kashmir and the complex multipolar regional environment, including China’s CPEC presence in Afghanistan—complicate indirect strategic manoeuvres and limit India’s operational flexibility. 

In summary, while geopolitics may prioritize stability over ideals, this support highlights tensions between India’s democratic principles and the practicalities of engaging ideologically aligned groups. It risks amplifying conservative ideologies domestically, potentially at the cost of women’s rights, security, and social harmony.

Overall, yes, India appears capable on paper—its pragmatic shift toward the Taliban (driven by Pakistan’s declining leverage and shared anti-ISIS interests) demonstrates Sun Tzu-like adaptability. The strategy could yield high gains, like economic access to Afghan minerals and reduced cross-border threats. India has the tools and precedent for this Sun Tzu-inspired strategy, but execution amid unresolved Wahhabi-driven radicalization remains uncertain—a “bold yet perilous shift” between necessity and risk. Success depends on sustained state capacity and avoiding overreach.