The dust from the Rio BRICS+ summit has not really settled. The bloc has expanded to ten full members, added a string of partners, and is now openly compared with the G7 in growth forecasts and geopolitical weight. Fresh commentary this week on BRICS versus the G7 in 2026 growth projections and on whether a BRICS financial bubble is forming has reopened a basic question. Who will shape BRICS+ over the next decade, and on whose terms.
For India, the answer is simple. BRICS+ cannot be allowed to harden into a China centric formation where Beijing sets the agenda and everyone else adjusts. New Delhi wants a strong Global South platform. It does not want a platform that becomes a multiplier for Chinese leverage.
India likes BRICS, not Chinese hierarchy
BRICS has always been a paradox. On paper, it is a grouping of equals. In practice, China towers over the rest in GDP and trade. Analysts have long noted that India and Brazil are cautious about any move that would expand the bloc in a way that deepens Chinese dominance or brings in countries that are clearly in Beijing’s orbit.
With BRICS+ expansion now a reality, that anxiety is no longer theoretical. New members bring energy, finance and diplomatic heft, but they also change the internal balance. China and Russia have been more aggressive about fast expansion. India has preferred a slower, criteria based approach, backing states like the UAE that align with its own economic and strategic priorities. The signal from New Delhi is consistent. India wants a multipolar world, not a world that simply swaps one centre of gravity for another.
The Rio declaration and India’s 2026 chair
At Rio in July, the BRICS leaders signed the Rio de Janeiro Declaration under the theme of strengthening Global South cooperation for more inclusive and sustainable governance. India backed that vision, but also ensured the language emphasised sovereign equality, development priorities, and respect for different political systems.
The same summit announced that India will take over the BRICS chair in 2026 and host the next leaders summit. That chairship is not just ceremonial. It gives New Delhi control over agenda setting, working group focus, and the diplomatic choreography of who gets invited, who gets spotlight, and which ideas are pushed into joint communiqués.
Think tanks and policy commentators inside India have already begun framing this as an opportunity to move BRICS+ from talk to delivery, and to dilute structural advantages that China currently enjoys in trade flows and finance
The core friction: architecture, currency, and who writes the rules
The most sensitive debates inside BRICS+ today are about architecture.
- A BRICS credit rating agency that never really took off
- Discussions on a common currency or invoicing mechanisms in local currencies
- The future of the New Development Bank
On each of these, China would prefer faster movement and designs that mesh comfortably with its Belt and Road and renminbi internationalisation goals. India is more cautious. Commentaries on BRICS expansion and common currency have noted how internal disagreements, including India’s reluctance, have repeatedly slowed grand schemes. Shankaria’s Parliament+1
For New Delhi, the risk is clear. If BRICS banking, lending and payments are built around Chinese capacity, then political influence will inevitably follow. India wants a BRICS+ that can mobilise capital for the Global South, but not at the price of making partners more dependent on Beijing.
Natural coalitions inside BRICS+
India is not isolated in this view. Brazil is wary of overconcentration of power in any one capital. South Africa has its own sensitivities about sovereignty and external pressure. Several new members want access to finance and markets, but do not want to be dragged into a United States versus China contest as formal clients of either side.
This creates space for quiet alignment. India, Brazil and South Africa are not forming a formal bloc within a bloc, but they often share instincts. That opens room for issue based coalitions on governance reforms, climate financing, digital standards and development projects that are not branded as Chinese initiatives.
Why this matters to India’s wider foreign policy
India’s behaviour inside BRICS+ is not an isolated story. It is part of a broader posture.
- Work with the West where interests overlap, but retain freedom of manoeuvre
- Engage China in multilateral platforms, but resist any hierarchy
- Claim leadership of the Global South without turning it into an anti West crusade
As new BRICS+ economic forecasts and essays on the future of the grouping fill the global debate this week, India’s line becomes sharper. It wants BRICS+ to be a serious economic and political platform, not a megaphone for Chinese talking points.
New Delhi knows it cannot match China’s GDP yet. What it can do is shape rules, narratives and coalitions. The 2026 chair will be India’s biggest chance in years to do exactly that.
