With the temporary ceasefire on hold, the attack on tourists in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, turned a new chapter in India Pakistan relations. An immediate ceasefire has halted military action, and diplomatic engagement has come to an absolute standstill for now. In all of this, the abeyance of the Indus Water Treaty by India emerged as a big talking point. It remains a big talking point even now, given how Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif has called it the “red line”. To quote his statement:
“Do not dictate us. Water is our red line; don’t even think about diverting our water. Yes, water and blood do not flow together. You have also hit our Neelum-Jhelum water project. If the damage was severe, we could have destroyed your major dams, including Baglihar Dam.”
There has been a lot written on the history of the Indus Water Treaty, which used to govern the sharing of waters between India and Pakistan. One of the key reasons this treaty was hailed globally for a long time was its attempt to remove geography and territorial control from the discussion table altogether. The brains behind the treaty had attempted, without success, to first get the two countries to jointly manage water resources.
However, as that did not pan out, it essentially got the two countries to agree to a water sharing mechanism that kept the non-issue of Jammu Kashmir out of the purview. The Indus Water Treaty sought to divide the rivers in their entirety – the Western rivers of Indus, Chenab and the Jhelum (Sindhu, Chandrabhaga and Vitasta) would flow without much hindrance to Pakistan, while the Eastern Rivers of Ravi, Sutlej and Beas (Parushni, Shutudri and Vipasha) were fully allocated to India. Of course, as the Treaty stated, a couple of fine points needed to be noted:
- The Chenab shall be deemed to include the river Panjnad; and
- the river Chandra and the river Bhaga shall be deemed to be Tributaries of The Chenab.
- The term “Main” added after Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, Beas or Ravi means the main stem of the named river excluding its Tributaries, but including all channels and creeks of the main stem of that river and such Connecting Lakes as form part of the main stem itself. The Jhelum Main shall be deemed to extend up to Verinag, and the Chenab Main up to the confluence of the river Chandra and the river Bhaga.
It was not that the treaty was a bed of roses in its operation. Pakistan was never satisfied with the treaty, especially considering it unfair to their interests. India too was never happy with the treaty provisions, and had in fact sent at least three notices under article XII of the treaty to seek a renegotiation. To specify, Article XII.3 specifically states the following:
- The provisions of this Treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments.
The treaty, in all fairness, had very little to do with the Indus river. Despite its name, much of the tense back and forth till 1960 was about the flows of the Sutlej, and subsequently about the Chenab. Under the 1960 treaty, India had, as part of the settlement, even paid to ensure that Article IV.1 of the treaty (Mentioned below) could be fulfilled:
Pakistan shall use its best endeavours to construct and bring into operation, with due regard to expedition and economy, that part of a system of works which will accomplish the replacement, from the Western Rivers and other sources, of water supplies for irrigation canals in Pakistan which, on 15th August 1947, were dependent on water supplies from the Eastern Rivers.
India, as per the treaty, made a fixed contribution of £62.6 million ($4 billion today) towards the costs of these works. This amounted to 15% of the overall cost of the total funds spent in Pakistan particularly to build a series of projects, including the Tarbela Dam, completion of the Mangla Dam, and the important link canals like Trimmu-Sidhnai-Mailsi-Bahawal Link Canal and the Chashma-Jhelum Link Canal along with the Mailsi siphon.
It must be noted that these works were essentially done to divert waters from the Chenab and the Indus to compensate for the loss of the flow of the Eastern rivers, all of which already had extensive water works built around them. The whole dispute had simmered since 1948 about the rights of the usage of water. While India invoked the principle of territorial sovereignty over water, Pakistan had continually invoked the prior appropriation doctrine. Pakistan’s argument had arisen due to the fact that all the irrigation works developed by the British were done first in Sindh and then in Pakistan Punjab – in fact, they hardly built anything for the eastern part of Punjab, which included modern day Haryana.
Water Flow into Pakistan before the Indus Water Treaty
Has water been stopped before? The answer is yes. That too twice, before the Indus Water Treaty had come to life. The first time happened in 1948. To quote one of the men involved then and in the Indus Water Treaty, Niranjan D. Gulhati:
“The first of April 1948 is an important date in the history of the ‘Canal Waters Dispute’. As stated in the preceding chapter, the impact of partition on the Pakistan irrigation system was felt, for the first time, on the first of April 1948 when, on the expiry of the Stand-still Agreements relating to the Central Bari Doab Canal (C.B.D.C.) and the barrage at Ferozepur, East Punjab discontinued, on the first of April 1948, the delivery of waters from Upper Bari Doab Canal (U.B.D.C.) to the lower part of this canal, C.B.D.C. in West Punjab,** thus adding one more controversy to the many problems which had emerged, since partition, between the two new provinces…..It may, however, be stated in fairness to East Punjab that it shut off the supplies to the C.B.D.C. only for a few days, just to establish for good its legal rights on U.B.D.C. On 29th March, 1948, East Punjab had formally notified West Punjab that the ‘Standstill Agreements’ would expire on 31st March.
In response to request from West Punjab for extension of Standstill Agreements and for a discussion between the chief engineers of the two Provinces, East Punjab invited West Punjab to send its chief engineers to Simla, the new headquarters of East Punjab, on 15th April to negotiate an agreement for the resumption of water supplies. The chief engineers of the two Punjabs met in Simla and, on 1 8th April, 1948, concluded two agreements, as between the Governments of East Punjab and West Punjab, which were to “take effect” from the date of their “ratification by the Dominions of India and Pakistan.”…… A conference was fixed for 3rd May, 1948, at New Delhi and under instructions from the Prime Minister, orders were issued by the East Punjab authorities on 30th April to resume water supply to the C.B.D.C. and to open the Dipalpur Canal, “on basis of agreement arrived at Simla recently subject to any variation which might be made at the inter- Dominion conference on the 3rd of May.”
The second time the water was stopped was in 1952, but it arose from a mistake in the interpretation of the orders by the engineers concerned in Indian Punjab. At that time, Jawaharlal Nehru, true to his nature, personally intervened in the matter, suspecting foul play on the Indian side. He however found no such reason, and soon the problem was restored. However, it must be stated that the focus that time was to ensure that irrigation could be developed across Indian Punjab (including Haryana) and Rajasthan, which due to the headworks of the Ganga Canal going into Pakistan territory.
This was achieved to an extent with the strategically built projects such as the Bhakra Nangal Dam, the Harike Barrage at the convergence of Beas and Sutlej, creating a feed to the Ganga Canal that lay entirely within Indian territory. This in fact had its share of political casualties, with N V Gadgil and Gopichand Bhargava suffering on this subject among other accounts. The fruition of these projects at the time was among the key reasons why India also came forth with the river sharing formula, which eventually became the back bone of the Indus Water Treaty.
NOTE: The article has been written by Satyanveshi, the author’s preferred pen name. The author is an expert on Geopolitics and Energy Security.
