This is the 2nd part in the series of articles explaining the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan. It is recommended that readers check out the 1st part here before proceeding with the 2nd part below.
Understanding the Mathematics of the Indus Water Treaty
Indus river basin includes these six rivers plus Kabul and Konar Rivers flowing in from Afghanistan. The combined annual flow of these rivers is estimated to be about 168 million acre feet (MAF). A point of focus in this discussion is the Kabul River, which accounts for about 27 MAF. This implies that there is about 141 MAF annual discharge through the Western and Eastern Rivers. Of these, 80 percent flows to the Western Rivers and about 20 percent through the Eastern Rivers, and these estimates are essentially the backbone of Treaty, where the water sharing formula is on these lines.
The reality on the ground has been anything but satisfactory, as noted by Vivekananda International Foundation. In 2019, the then Pakistan minister of water resources, Mr. Muhammad Faisal Vawda replied to a question in the National Assembly that uncontrolled/unavoidable flow escapages by India do occur, and are efficiently utilized in integrated operation of the river system by the Indus River Systems Authority (IRSA). A calculation by the Vivekananda International Foundation on this reveals the truth to this statement.
Interestingly, India was permitted to construct storage of water on Western Rivers (Annexure-E) up to a maximum of 3.6 million acre feet (MAF) for various purposes. At the time of the treaty’s signing, nothing had been built. Maj. Gen. Chaturvedi (2018) has pointed out two more important factors that bear significantly on the IWT but have no provisions in the current treaty.
Firstly, the treaty suffers from the lack of recognition of changing social, economic, technical and environmental issues, e.g., increased urbanisation in the region has also led to massive deforestation, increased pollution and the drainage system getting blocked due to squatters, which has further adversely affected the water availability and consequent demand supply gap on either side of the border.
Pakistan suffers particularly more so, given its extreme dependency. As per Manhas (2025), Pakistan’s water availability per capita has dropped by over 70% in the past seven decades, and currently stands at just 1,017 cubic meters, veeringly close to the global water scarcity threshold of 1,000 cubic meters. This alarming decline is compounded by the fact that Pakistan’s water storage capacity is only enough to cover 30 days of demand, far lower than the global average of 120 days. Climate change, erratic precipitation, drastic reduction in forest cover, and mismanagement of water resources is a big challenge – nearly 41 MAF is lost by seepage from unlined canals, which results in water logging, rendering the land useless for agriculture.
Secondly, Rights of Gujarat were totally missed out while negotiating on IWT. Negotiations were steered by David Lilienthal at the behest of the World Bank, and in the process the rights of Gujarat were not addressed. In pre-partition India, there was a Kutch vs Sind rights over Indus waters discussion going on, that was totally sidelined. As a result, the conduct of Pakistan in not getting design concurrence for its Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) violates the IWT. This Drain passes through the Great Rann of Kutch, over areas adjacent to India’s Kutch, and causes floods besides contaminating water bodies on the Indian side, in violation of the Article VI and Article IX of the IWT.
India’s actions On the Western Rivers
One of the main clauses of the IWT has been the limited uses allowed to India on the Western Rivers. Under Article III.2, it has been clearly stated that:
- India shall be under an obligation to let flow all the waters of the Western Rivers, and shall not permit any interference with these waters, except for the following uses, restricted (except as provided in item (c) (11) of Paragraph 5 of Annexure C) in the case of each of the rivers, The Indus, The Jhelum and The Chenab, to the drainage basin thereof
- Domestic Use;
- Non-Consumptive Use;
- Agricultural Use, as set out in Annexure C; and
- Generation of hydro-electric power, as set out in Annexure D.
Here, it must be pointed out that:
- Annexure C focuses on the permissible withdrawal from the Chenab for the Ranbir and Pratap canals that were built pre-independence by the Dogra rulers of Jammu and Kashmir.
- Annexure D defines the nature of hydro-electric power from Run-of-river projects and the protocol for communicating to Pakistan about the development of new projects by India and seeking their consent.
The Annexure D and its five Appendices have been heavily weaponised by Pakistan in the past even though it barely gained anything significant. The first case was during the development of the Salal Hydro-electric project. Under the terms of the Treaty, India submitted its plan to the Permanent Indus Commission for Pakistan’s approval in 1968. In 1974 Pakistan officially objected to the design of Salal project arguing that it did not confirm to the criteria for design of such hydroelectric projects laid down under the Treaty. During the course of the negotiations, several options were discussed for reaching to a final settlement including resort to the arbitration procedure provided in the Treaty.
Finally, India agreed to make some changes in the design of the dam including reducing the height of the dam and to the permanent closure of the diversion canal after the hydel plant had been commissioned. That led to the dam becoming limited in the benefit it generated for India, as continued objections meant that the dam could not be desilted. This, in addition to the project cost overrun due to delays, had an overall negative bearing. Same was the case with the Baglihar and Kishenganga projects as well – despite being run of the river projects, the entire life cycle saw deliberate pains. As a result, there is an estimated recurring loss of ₹2,650 crore annually in Baglihar due to the IWT, while the total losses are over ₹33,250 crore on Chenab basin.
Deterrence does not come from the neutral arbitration process for Pakistan even if it suffers problems. The latest example for an embarrassment for the country came in January 2025, when the neutral expert Michael Lino had ruled that India was right in not entertaining the dispute’s settlement in the Court of Arbitration, and that the neutral expert as envisaged under the treaty was competent to deal with the subject for the cases of the Ratle and Kishenganga projects. Further, Mr. Lino had noted that Pakistan was attempting to push the boundaries on what was acceptable. Quoting from the award:
‘…Pakistan’s submissions in these Proceedings suggest that at least part of what happened is that, as Pakistan became more aware of the ramifications of the points of difference it had initially sought to put before a neutral expert, it determined that a more effective and economical strategy would be to pursue its points in a manner that could ultimately impact not only the KHEP and the RHEP, but would also “set the rules of the game” for India’s whole project of development of HEPs on the Western Rivers…”’
One thing that most people overlook is the fact that most of the opposition has been on the Chenab and Jhelum rivers and their flows. The various projects opposed by Pakistan – Pakal Dul, Ratle, Dul Hasti, or Salal, Baglihar and Kishenganga in the past – are entirely on the two rivers. The reason for the opposition is well understood because Chenab (and Jhelum particularly post merger with Chenab) has been the river utilized by Pakistan under the IWT to compensate for the loss of the Ravi and Sutlej (Beas merges into Sutlej before entering Pakistan) under the IWT. This is exactly why any dam that will be proposed on the two rivers particularly will always be opposed. This has created a significant problem for India domestically as well.
How the Indus Water Treaty has been grossly unfair to Jammu & Kashmir
The Indus Water Treaty has been grossly unfair to the people of Jammu and Kashmir – this is a position acknowledged as early as 2009 within Indian policy circles. Within Jammu Kashmir too, the narrative for the longest time has been against the IWT.
The administration has long argued that of the estimated potential of 20,000 MW (identified potential being 16,480 MW) of the Indus River Basin, a large percentage cannot be harnessed for the benefit of the state as IWT only allows for run-of-the-river projects that do not affect the riparian rights of Pakistan. Thanks to the treaty, Jammu Kashmir has lagged behind by an estimated ₹6,500 crore annually as per a 2005 report – the number would be certainly higher when adjusted for today. The treaty has also had a detrimental impact on the UT’s potential for agriculture and power generation.
Recently, Omar Abdullah, the Union Territory’s Chief Minister, had stated his rather strong dissent on the treaty, and indirectly urged the restart of the Tulbul Navigation Project or Wular Barrage which seeks to make stretches of the Jhelum navigable through the year if executed.
The impact is telling, especially for agriculture in the Union Territory. In 1960-1961, the UT could irrigate 274,000 hectares (ha) of agricultural land. But in 2020–2021, it could only irrigate 318,890 ha, a marginal increase of 16 per cent over more than six decades. The big loser has of course been Jammu division – most of the projects like Salal that could have helped with irrigation were delayed endlessly or rendered ineffective. Further, work on the expansion of the Ranbir and Pratap canals was effectively curtailed with the limits set on the quantum of water that they could draw.
On top of it, projects like the Ujh multipurpose project, which was on the Ujh tributary of the Ravi, a river fully allocated to India under the Treaty, were also objected to. Even on the Shahpur Kandi project on the Ravi, which has been built in Indian Punjab, a territory beyond dispute, there has been unnecessary hue and cry from Pakistan – this, despite the fact that coupled with the Ujh project, the Kandi stretch of Jammu will finally manage to see irrigation for the farm lands.
The reasons why Pakistan does not want any work in Jammu and Kashmir is two-fold. Firstly, it is in its interest to continue raking a non-issue by seeking its internationalization. Secondly, water is seen as the jugular vein in Pakistan. Fact remains that both the issues are linked to the hip for Pakistan. To quote from the writings of academic Fozia Lone (2019):
“Kashmir faces a dual challenge to its stability: the ongoing armed conflict over its territory and the Indian dams on the western rivers that impinge on its resource utilisation, agriculture, and economy. On 5 August 2019, India abrogated Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, eliminating Kashmir’s autonomous status within the Indian Union. Reports suggest that New Delhi has since accelerated its defiance of the IWT by constructing dams on waters flowing into Pakistan…. Kashmir, partly held by Pakistan and China, is connected to a complex geopolitical jigsaw of territorial and water disputes. There are serious concerns about the negative impacts of the IWT on the geographical, climatological, and socio-political elements of the Indus Basin in ways that acutely concern Kashmiris.”
This viewpoint pretty much sums up the Pakistani position on the joint nature of the dispute, of course driven by the idea that a new Medina inclusive of the lands of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh has to be created. Any action thus, even if in line with the Indus Water Treaty, will be flagged as a violation. To quote from a 2017 paper published in Pakistan to highlight ‘violations’ of the Kishanganga and Wular projects:
“…any type of water-control structure enables India to intimidate Pakistan, as it has the potential to ruin the entire system of Triple Canals Project (namely, the Upper Jhelum Canal, the Upper Chenab Canal and the Lower Bari Doab Canal)…. Since the Mangla Dam near Mirpur is fed by River Jhelum, development of the Wullar Lake into a barrage would put its survival at stake. The Dam produces half of the total hydro-power used in Pakistan, and interference in its functioning would cause a severe power shortage in Azad Kashmir and half of Pakistan….construction of the Barrage would jeopardize irrigation of two- thirds of the cultivated area of the Punjab, and also…give India the power to flood 13 million acres whenever it wished.”…The control of Jhelum River by India coupled with the river Chenab….and the three eastern rivers…would give it further military advantages….India would be able to control the mobility of Pakistani troops by flooding the battlefield or canals, and could equally enhance manoeuvrability of its own troops by closing the barrage gates, rendering the canal system dry and easy to traverse.”
These diplomatic attempts of creating a stasis clearly demonstrate that the Pakistani strategy of weaponizing the IWT has clearly is not driven by any pan-Pakistan or pan-ummah ideology; instead, it is solely focused on improving the prospects of the Punjab province and reinforcing the hold of the feudal landlords who run their politics the same way today as they did in 1930. The Wadera politics of Pakistan at large and of Sindh in a smaller sense continue to drive the dialectical discourse deployed by the country for the IWT.
The problem with this diplomatic tangle created by Pakistan is entirely of its own making. Ahmed et al (2023) have highlighted in academic literature that one of the foremost issues that society faces is the increasing problem of water shortage, which is mostly attributed to population growth, urban development, and the effects of climate change. Inefficient irrigation methods and inadequate distribution infrastructure create further pressures. Moreover, due to the reduced storage capacity resulting from poorly managed dams and reservoirs and insufficient infrastructure for treatment of wastewater both shortage and significant health risks are faced by the people at large. Coupled with the challenges of reduced precipitation due to climate change and massive deforestation, the country is facing significant challenges.
The Living Indus Initiative
It is not that the country has not recognised these challenges or not sought to act on them. Under the Living Indus initiative, more than 1 million hectares of land has been restored, with plans to bring 25 million hectares under restoration by 2030. Launched in 2021, Living Indus aims to scale up efforts to protect the natural resources of the Indus Basin, which is home to 90 percent of Pakistan’s people and irrigates 80 percent of its arable land. However, the initiative, which needs $17 billion financial support for its implementation, is floundering, as international climate finance is unavailable to the already fiscally broke country.
The stubbornness thus to either re-negotiate the Indus Water Treaty to account for the new realities or to work internally on improving on its rather wasteful management of water and the consequences arising from it are factors that hurt the country significantly. The International Water Management Institute (IWMI) has highlighted how in Pakistan, freshwater scarcity is a major reason for farmers turning to wastewater for food production (which can create significant health hazards for a large number of people). The case of Faisalabad’s municipality auctioning wastewater stands out, as farmers are willing to even pay premiums over and above the fees being paid for canal irrigation access just to ensure timely irrigation for their fields. To quote from another IWMI study:
“With insufficient supply of freshwater of low salinity to support irrigated crop production, farmers in the dry climate of Faisalabad in Pakistan overcame organizational, infrastructure and legal obstacles to secure access to urban wastewater. Like for freshwater (canal water), also wastewater became a marketable commodity farmers pay for. The wastewater provider, the Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA) in Faisalabad, uses public auctions for bulk sale of its wastewater to farmers, a system keeps WASA’s transaction costs low…..For the water use, they pay WASA which allows WASA to maintain control over the resource as a service provider. The water fee ranges from USD 10 to USD 62 per hectare per year depending on the quantity and the quality of wastewater. The payment is on top of what farmers pay for freshwater. The highest fees were paid for untreated wastewater with lower fees paid for wastewater from anaerobic ponds. A unique feature of this business case is that the wastewater is sold annually in bulk by WASA through an open auction to the highest bidder from the village, and the winning farmer resells the surplus wastewater to fellow farmers.”
NOTE: The article has been written by Satyanveshi, the author’s preferred pen name. The author is an expert on Geopolitics and Energy Security.
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