याचना नहीं, अब रण होगा, जीवन-जय या कि मरण होगा. (No more pleas, now the battle will be, Victory in life or death it shall be. )
These lines by Ramdhari Singh Dinkar, from the “Warning of Krishna” section of his epic poem Rashmirathi, were quoted during the armed forces press conference on May 12, 2025 regarding “Operation Sindoor“—the retaliatory strikes on terrorist camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir following the massacre of Hindu tourists in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir.
Incensed by Duryodhan’s unyielding refusal of the Pandavas’ peaceful overtures, Lord Krishna declared that negotiations were futile and war was the only recourse. These lines not only express the emotions and actions of the present Indian government over its kinetic action on Pakistan but also its position on the Indus Water treaty that has been kept in abeyance for the first time since it was signed in 1948.
When Diplomacy Is Not Enough
There have been many views on the decision by the Indian government to place the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance or use it as a strategic tool against Pakistan. Most of them have been from the left-leaning policymakers and newspapers that have decried India’s decision to use water as a strategic tool against Pakistan as legally questionable, morally problematic, and geopolitically risky. One of the reasons cited is water is an essential element of life hence, it is a “basic human right” issue as if the killing of thousands of innocents for decades in India by Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is not.
These arguments are framed from the age-old perspective of maintaining the status quo when faced with a consistently belligerent enemy where the only pragmatic action expected from the sensible side is restraint and dialogue. A decisive action that does not fit the well-trodden diplomatic path is an anathema in international affairs. Rightly so because one doesn’t know from which quarter one will need help and support in the future.
This is why India has skillfully maintained friendly relations with all parties in the polarized global landscape, marked by conflicts like the Middle East and Russia-Ukraine. This includes Israel, its adversaries of the Axis of Evil like Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran, as well as Ukraine, Russia, the US, and to some extent, China, ensuring potential support from diverse quarters.
Pakistan: A Different Ballgame
Pakistan is a different ball game. The relentless unprovoked assault of all kinds, be it physical or ideological, fosters India’s sovereign rights and the moral imperative to protect its citizens, and the strategic necessity of responding to Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism in whichever it wants.
India has been patient for a very long time and has adhered to the IWT for over six decades, even during wars (1965, 1971, 1999) and repeated terrorist attacks. While the treaty’s survival is commendable (exclusively because of inaction by the previous soft rule of Congress), its durability does not impose an eternal obligation on India, not at least for the BJP.
A lot has been written on the technical aspect of the treaty including Pakistan’s repeated obstruction of India’s permissible hydropower projects (e.g., Kishanganga and Ratle) by escalating technical disputes to arbitration, delaying India’s legitimate rights under the treaty. However, not much attention has been given to the degree of freedom India has in not obligating those technical aspects. This government with “Operation Sindoor” and keeping the treaty in abeyance has shown that it is done playing nice or playing with anyone’s rule book including the treaty itself.
Pakistan
Due to its strategic location and use by Americans to counter the Russians on its North and Afghanistan on its west, Pakistan has been metamorphosed from a state to a mere pawn. Regardless of the kind of government it has, be it a few bouts of elected governments or long-lasting military dictators, Pakistan has only focused on being useful for someone else, rather than itself or its people.
Pakistan actively disregarded UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which prohibits states from supporting terrorism. As a result, its home-grown terrorism grew so pervasive that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey-listed the country from 2018-2022.
Having Pakistan as a neighbour is the greatest challenge India faces for which it has to spend a tremendous amount of resources, time, and manpower that could be used for developing itself. Pakistan has been repeatedly linked to terrorist activities targeting India, including the 1999 Kargil War, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the 2016 Uri attack, and the 2019 Pulwama attack, with groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed operating from Pakistani soil.
So far India has been restrained for the lack of courage if not the patience. One of the excuses the previous weak government has given is the identity, culture and way of life both countries share so closely.
The Treaty with Pakistan
Pakistan is not the only country with which India shares rivers and hence water. Neighbours like Nepal and Bangladesh (cited as potential concerns in recent times) have distinct water-sharing arrangements with India (e.g., the Kosi and Ganges treaties), which India has honoured, reducing the risk of broader regional problems.
Some might argue that unilateral withdrawal from the IWT is legally impermissible under the Vienna Convention, as the treaty lacks a withdrawal clause. However, international law allows the suspension or termination in cases of material breach or fundamental change of circumstances (Articles 60 and 62 of the Vienna Convention). Pakistan’s support for terrorism and its obstruction of India’s treaty-compliant projects could be argued as a material breach, providing India with legal grounds to reconsider its obligations.
Besides, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus (Latin for “things thus standing”) is a legal principle in international law that allows a treaty to be terminated or suspended if there has been a fundamental change of circumstances (material breach) that was not foreseen at the time of its framing a treaty. It allows for a way to adapt treaties to new realities when the original conditions upon which they were based have fundamentally changed.
The circumstances during which IWT was signed have changed
The IWT, signed in 1960, was premised on mutual cooperation and goodwill between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s sponsorship of cross-border terrorism, as acknowledged by global entities like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and various UN Security Council resolutions, constitutes a fundamental breach of the mutual trust that underpins the treaty.
As evidence Pakistan has been repeatedly linked to terrorist activities targeting India, including the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the 2016 Uri attack, and the 2019 Pulwama attack, with groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed operating from Pakistani soil. Hence India could argue that Pakistan’s failure to uphold its international obligations undermines the IWT’s foundational assumptions, justifying a review or suspension of the treaty.
A similar example is the plebiscite in Kashmir United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 requires Pakistan to fulfil specific conditions for a plebiscite in Kashmir, including restoring peace and order by withdrawing tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, preventing further intrusions, and ceasing material aid to fighters. Until Pakistan meets these obligations, India can refuse to conduct the plebiscite.
Moral Concerns and National Security
Using water as leverage, particularly within the framework of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), presents a moral dilemma for India. This approach risks causing harm to Pakistani civilians, a consequence that violates international humanitarian norms. While humanitarian considerations are crucial, they must be balanced against India’s primary duty: to protect its own citizens from terrorism.
From India’s perspective, the responsibility for any negative “downstream” impact of such actions ultimately lies with Pakistan’s government. This is because Pakistan’s alleged failure to curb terrorist groups operating from its territory has, in India’s view, forced India to consider what it deems “extreme measures” for self-defense.
It was not long ago when the Minister of External Affairs Dr. S. Jaishankar said, ‘Europe Has to Grow Out of Mindset That Its Problems Are World’s Problems.’ Western nations have historically prioritized strategic interests over moral consistency in their support for Pakistan. Then why should India be held to a solely moral standard when other powerful nations have not adhered to the same?
Dr. S. Jaishankar was referencing the lack of a UN condemnation of Hamas as an example of the international double standards. Added to that is the expansion of NATO in the backyard of Russia that started the Russian annexation of Ukraine, or the UK sending aid to Hamas and President Trump serenading the global terror’s supporter Qatar not to mention shaking hands with Jolani, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, on whom his country had a $10m bounty a decade ago.
The shift underway in Indian Strategic Outlook
Historically, India has often been perceived as prioritizing moral considerations over strategic ones in its foreign policy. However, as India’s economy and power grow, it will increasingly adopt a more pragmatic, strategic approach, similar to powerful Western nations. Moral consistency is a luxury that a powerful nation indulges in when it is safe and India has never been safe. Henceforth, the national security and strategic advantage will increasingly dictate India’s foreign policy choices.
Moreover, weaponizing the IWT carries escalation risks, albeit of a more subtle kind. Manipulating water flows could be akin to the ‘troll missions’ flown by American ‘Wild Weasel’ pilots during the Vietnam War. In those dangerous operations, these specialized aircraft would deliberately act as bait, exposing themselves to enemy radar emissions from concealed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites.
The objective was not to direct attack, but to provoke the enemy into firing their missiles, thereby revealing their otherwise hidden positions. Once the SAM site was forced to engage, its location became known, making it vulnerable to subsequent counter-attacks by other friendly aircraft. Similarly, using water as leverage might subtly pressure Pakistan, forcing it to react in ways that reveal its vulnerabilities or intentions, even if it doesn’t immediately lead to open conflict.
About the Author: Bholenath Vishwakarma is an environmental engineering and policy expert with a passion for literature and storytelling. He has published articles on literature, urban planning, and social issues in prominent national magazines and newspapers. His debut short story collection, set in the Columbia University campus and New York, is awaiting publication.
Note: The opinions in the article are those of the author alone and do not reflect the Editorial Line of ForPol.
