Note: This article is the third and final instalment in the series: ‘The Mathematics of the Indus Water Treaty Explained: The Complete History of IWT’ authored by Satyanveshi. Readers are suggested to read the 1st (here) and 2nd (here) part to gain a full understanding of the context before beginning the final instalment.
Pivots in the Indian Strategy Over IWT – What Led to the Current Situation
India has for the longest time adhered to the Indus Water Treaty provisions. It has even adopted a re-design (like in Salal) or abandon projects (Tulbul Navigation) to uphold the treaty in letter and spirit. There had been talks about relooking at the treaty going back to March 2003, when the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly passed a Resolution asking the Central government to reconsider the Indus Water Treaty to safeguard the interests of the state. Interestingly, in 2016, there was a PIL in the Supreme Court of India to declare the treaty unconstitutional – the case remains pending in the court to date.
The strategic shift in Indian thinking on the subject, perhaps, can be traced back to September 2016. In the wake of the terror attack in Uri, Jammu and Kashmir, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had stated that “blood and water cannot flow together at the same time” in a meeting on the Indus Water Treaty. The meeting, attended by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and then foreign secretary S Jaishankar, also decided to set up an inter-ministerial task forces to go into the details and working of the Treaty on an urgent basis. Subsequently, in a public rally in Bathinda that year, Mr. Modi remarked on the need to ensure that water must reach the farmers’ field. To quote the Prime Minister’s speech:
“My farmers have the right over the water that flows through Indus, will strive to get that water back. The water which flows from here remains unused by Pakistan and flows into the sea. The fields of our farmers must have adequate water. Water that belongs to India cannot be allowed to go to Pakistan. If the farmers of Punjab get adequate water, they can harvest gold from their fields.”
The Pakistani reaction was of course predictable, with Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaj Aziz, saying that revocation of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) by India “can be taken as an act of war”. However, the seriousness of the matter really came to the surface in 2019, when in the wake of the Pulwama attack, Union Minister Nitin Gadkari tweeted about the government’s decision to ensure full utilization of the Indian share under the IWT.
Consequently, focus moved on ensuring total utilization of the Ravi’s waters. Thus, the Ujh project and the Shahpurkandi project, languishing for decades, were fast tracked. Ujh multipurpose project creates a storage of about 781 million cubic metres of water on Ujh, a tributary of Ravi, for irrigation and power generation and provide a total irrigation benefits of 31,380 hectares in Kathua, Hiranagar and Samba districts of Jammu and Kashmir. Shahpurkandi intends to store about 120 million cubic meters, and is designed to provide Irrigation facility to 5,000 hectares in Punjab and 32,173 hectares in J&K while producing 1042 MWh of electricity annually. This, along with the second Ravi-Beas link downstream of Ujh, are meant to ensure that. However, it must be pointed out that these projects assume that a 2 MAF water surplus was unutilized, whereas the reality is higher than this. Nonetheless, the waters of the Ravi will now stop spilling over into Pakistan.
As Rossi (2020) had remarked, Mr. Gadkari touched on a subject of primordial concern for Indo-Pakistani relations. Quoting a prominent diplomat of Pakistan, Rossi pointed out that the dispute over Kashmir and the distribution of the Indus waters are inseparable. In fact, in 1960, the so-called Chenab formula was proposed, that sought to divide Jammu and Kashmir along the Chenab River, granting Pakistan control over the Kashmir Valley, Ladakh and enough of Jammu “to give it command of the Chenab.” Former Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf advanced the proposal in 1999 as a means to end Pakistan’s water insecurity, which Dr. Manmohan Singh had nearly agreed upon in the guise of the Four Point Formula with Parvez Musharraf.
The call for re-negotiation was further empowered by a Parliamentary standing committee panel in 2021, that sought a renegotiation of the treaty. The point of contention of the committee was that climate change and environmental impact assessment (EIA) issues were missing in the original 1960 treaty. However, the seriousness of the Indian position started to become clear when, after the Kishanganga dam spat, it became clear that there are irreconcilable gaps in the treaty. Further, India took the rightful position of questioning the World Bank for not objecting to the parallel arbitration in the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) while engaging a neutral expert, effectively undermining the treaty’s bilateral nature. This prompted at least two notices to Pakistan under Article XII by the Indian side for a renegotiation of the treaty – The first formal notice was dated 25 January 2023, while the second notice, was dated 30 August 2024.
One obvious set of problems was the fact that the treaty failed to evolve with the evolution in technology and technical terms. Additionally, varying definitions on key technical issues e.g. the issue of pondage clearly necessitated a revisit of the treaty. Also, the data sharing protocols were rather outdated, reflecting the times of the treaty’s formulation. One of the big pain points created entirely by Pakistan in the treaty, for obvious reasons, has been the conflation of the technical aspect of the Treaty with broader security concerns. So long as the security establishment of Pakistan continues to interfere with transboundary water issues, a solution even with the IWT would remain out of sight always, as noted by Sattar and Bhargava (2019). Of course, with the various other problems listed above, it was no one’s case that both India and Pakistan should not seek a renegotiation. Unlike India though, Pakistan failed to have a technical outlook to a treaty that was essentially designed to keep politics out.
Pakistan’s problems also arise from this myopic political approach, given how it has vociferously opposed projects on the Chenab. The various dams proposed by India are all essentially run-of-the-river dams as defined by the international norms, which Pakistan refuses to understand. Thus, even as existing projects on the Chenab are in varying stages, any future projects of similar nature would really push Pakistan to the brink of a war, thanks to their myopic understanding. With seventeen proposed projects, the fears of Pakistan would really drive them insane.
India’s Legal Position on Renegotiation Makes Sense
Can India seek to renegotiate? Well, the answer lies in both the IWT and the Vienna Convention. While the Vienna Convention’s retrospective applicability is questioned, it does point out that in the absence of treaties not offering a path to recalibration, states can invoke general international law. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, or fundamental change of circumstances, provides one such possibility. Codified in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), it reflects the idea that a treaty may lose its binding force if the conditions under which it was concluded have radically altered.
Interestingly, Pakistan often quotes about good faith from the Vienna Convention, even though they alongwith India are not signatories to the VCLT. As per Babu and Garimella (2025), the threshold for invoking this principle has to be exceptionally high such that it qualifies to be “unforeseen, fundamental, and radically transform the extent of obligations still to be performed”. The principle can have applicability because two major factors – irreversible increase in population in the basin on both sides and decreasing water availability due to climate change – are factors that would clearly meet this threshold.
However, there is another line of argument that states that the Vienna Convention is not necessary, and that the route of renegotiation lies within the Indus Water Treaty itself. The second school states that Article XII has explicitly stated that the treaty can be renegotiated from time to time. This is a position of both legal soundness as well as realpolitik – after all, treaties last as long as they serve the purpose for which they were negotiated. The problem lies in the foolhardy approach taken by Pakistan about a treaty’s perpetuity, especially when it suits them. Now that Pakistan has scrapped unilaterally the Shimla Agreement (which it never adhered to in letter or in spirit), the question comes up – is India’s abeyance correct? Legally, yes, while in “humanitarian” terms, it may not be seen positively.
One criticism about such a move back in the day was that the position of the civilian population of Pakistan would harden against India. This well-intentioned argument has no meaning today and can be discarded. An entire nation stands indoctrinated in hatred of “Hindu India” run by “baniyas’ who are no match to the might of the “deendaar”. Attempts to ignore the raison d’être of Pakistan – creating a nation that is different from Hindus and India.
The root of the two-nation theory sowed by Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi in 1564 and encoded in Fatawa Alamgiri by Sheikh Nizam Burhanpuri and Shah Abdul Rahim in 1672 saw its culmination in the creation of Pakistan in 1947. The rhetoric in writing, in Pakistan Studies textbooks, and in their entertainment industry, is proof that the civilian population does not consider Indians their equal. They will, thanks to the indoctrination, always side against India in any circumstance – even if it was taking Pakistan’s side. Therefore, only cold, calculated measures are needed.
The abeyance of the treaty by India in wake of the Pahalgam attack also seems to be now having an impact. In the midst of the shrill propaganda, Pakistan on 8 May 2025 had quietly issued a notice in reply to the previous notices, claiming it was ready to restart talks with India on the Treaty. While the letter wanted the Commissioners to talk, India has been consistent in stating that no more meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) would be held till the governments of India and Pakistan meet and discuss the renegotiation of the IWT. The last meeting reportedly happened in Delhi in May 2022. Since January 2023, India has written four times to Pakistan to initiate talks on revising the treaty but, according to sources, not received a “satisfactory response.
Given India’s mood however, what is clear is that the abeyance will continue for at least the period of time that it will take for India to ensure that at least ten projects shall be prioritised. These are as follows: Uri 1 Stage II, New Ganderbal project on Sindh Nallah, Kirthai-II off Kishtwar on Chenab river, Sawalkot HEP in Ramban and Udhampur districts, Bichlari and Barinium/Shaus in Doda, Chandanwari Laripora in Anantnag, Lower Kalnai in Kishtwar, Wardwan Bursar in Kishtwar, Ans-1 in Reasi, Gangbal in Ganderbal and Kishanganga-II in Bandipora.
Further, a 3–4-month timeline cut is being attempted at Pakal Dul, Kiru, Parnai and Kwar projects, while the 850MW Ratle project, earlier slated for a November 2028 commissioning may see a jump up in schedule with the treaty as well the dispute mechanism heading into abeyance.
Meanwhile, for Pakistan, India will continue to raise objections on international funding for hydro projects it intends to build in disputed territory controlled illegally by it. It will also build pressure on Pakistan on the subject of illegally held territory, ratcheting up diplomatic heat. While China is attempting to build the Diamer Bhasha in Gilgit Baltistan, and the Azad Pattan, Kohala. Mahl, Karot and Chakhoti Hattian on the Jhelum in Pakistan occupied Jammu. However, it must be pointed out that the tone and approach the Chinese have taken have started to weigh heavy on the Pakistani establishment.
Work on Diamer Bhasha stopped in 2024 when Chinese engineers working on Dasu Dam were killed by suicide bombers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. World Bank funding has never been possible for the dream projects for Pakistan, which was why it managed to drag in China. However, given the low returns and extreme levels of financial crisis faced by Pakistan, China, true to its entrepreneur mindset of governance, will be forced to evaluate the cost versus benefit coming out from such projects.
Like much of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the dream shall evaporate after some modest work. Thanks to Pakistan’s own mistakes, The CPEC is a lost opportunity – only 38 of the nearly 90 envisioned projects have been completed, and just 23 are under construction. Far from triggering the promised wave of industrialization and regional integration, CPEC has stalled under the weight of Pakistan’s own inefficiencies, misplaced priorities, and worsening governance.
Counter the China Factor
Speaking of China, the China factor in the whole dispute has been repeatedly invoked. Many claim that China will engage in similar measures, causing discomfort for India. The action on Indus, Sutlej and Brahmaputra are much touted. However, only a small percentage of the water in the Indus (10-15%) and Sutlej (20%) originates from Tibet, making it difficult to stop entirely. Further, building large dams in the earthquake-prone region of Tibet is risky, and stopping water could affect the local ecology and communities, creating more problems in turn. Similarly, for the Brahmaputra, 50 per cent of the Brahmaputra River basin is in China, but it accounts for only 22 to 30 per cent of the total basin’s discharge. Cost-benefit ratios in such scenarios are negative for China, and many such ideas will eventually be abandoned by them.
China has a unilateral approach when it comes to watershed management. Its behaviour in the Mekong basin has caused much friction in South east Asia. China’s approach to the Mekong can be understood through two pillars of thought – protecting its rights by asserting its territorial prerogative to use and develop the Mekong waters; and a modernist development approach to fostering growth in the Mekong Basin. By not participating in the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and instead launching its own counter Lancang Mekong Commission (LMC) in 2016, China has shown less than desirable cooperation.
Similar is the case with its cooperation with Kazakhstan on the Irtysh and Ili rivers. The Ili River serves as the primary water source for Balkhash Lake in Kazakhstan, while the Irtysh River, which originates in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region, is the most important of the 24 trans-boundary rivers that run across China and Kazakhstan. China insists on priority rights to water withdrawal from these rivers, and does not recognize the concept of equal water-sharing along the border regions. Completing a large portion of the projects proposed for Xinjiang’s development under its Great Western Development Strategy essentially reduced Kazakhstan’s ability to seek parity to a zero. Instead, it has had to engage with China on unequal footing to seek to “prevent wastage of water”. Thus, to think that any rational behaviour will come from China in the first place is foolhardy.
Should the Brahmaputra dams be built, India should start to prepare for it. Here, Uttam Kumar Sinha’s five point formula is handy. According to Sinha, India should not harbour any apprehension and, instead, proactively take safeguarding measures well in advance.
a) Develop a Ganga-Meghna-Brahmaputra basin dialogue in which we can bring in Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal together that can be expanded by bringing in the lower Mekong basin countries.
b) Enhance our capability and capacity along the Brahmaputra on our side,” he said.
c) Deploy very advanced monitoring and verifying capabilities and should not depend on China for hydrological data.
d) Prepare flood water diversification and mitigation capabilities.
e) Use satellites by for flood risk mapping and flood forecasting, upgrade telemetry stations.
What Next for Pakistan – The Stakes are Too High
While Pakistan ratchets up pressure on the border and Line of Control, fact is that it cannot afford to get into a land based kinetic conflict beyond the scope of what it underwent between 6 and 10 May 2025. The strategy of the Pakistani establishment (i.e. the military) will be to up the ante on the asymmetric war front. Attempts will be made to ensure that Jammu and Kashmir remain hot, and work on the hydro electric projects in the state will certainly be targeted by Pakistani operated terror assets as a first step.
Pakistan is stuck between a rock and a hard place. Due to this, it will not be entirely surprising that Pakistan also attempts to engage India in a protracted military conflict. Think from their perspective – here is a country that has nothing to lose. It will be better to die a martyr than to accept humiliation from the “kafir”. That is why it is apt on India’s part to not call the temporary truce on the border as a ceasefire.
The one outcome of the ongoing conflict that no one has thought of so far is the descent of Pakistan into a full-fledged civil war. The war starts in Sindh and gets fanned further by the ongoing conflict in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa via the Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan. That is a scenario that Pakistan does not want. The war will in fact be triggered by the lack of water sharing and favouritism in water utilization by Punjab viz the other provinces. A glimpse of the same was seen in the anti-canal protests in Sindh in April 2025, which forced the Pakistani government to back down.
The only logical step thus, keeping most options in the balance, for Pakistan is to talk about a new Indus Treaty. Diplomatically, Pakistan will seek to re-open the treaty. While it has expressed willingness to renegotiate, the 8 May letter remains a formality because India will continue to keep the treaty in abeyance till at least 2027, by which time a lot of its projects in Jammu and Kashmir are expected to come online. In such a scenario, a new IWT will definitely be needed. However, Pakistan will attempt to make China and Afghanistan as parties to the new treaty by calling for a watershed level approach, hoping China and Afghanistan will side with it should a LMC style commission come up.
Will India accept such a scenario though? Highly unlikely, because the unresolved territorial dispute has to come up. A balanced treaty therefore that helps Pakistan will be acceptable to Indian establishment in one scenario – that Pakistan gives up Pakistan occupied Jammu Kashmir in its entirety, including Gilgit Baltistan. That is the only scenario where the water conflict can naturally evolve to, going by the trend that has emerged. China will certainly not step in directly in any of this, so long as it can buy itself a good deal with India.
Of course, crystal ball gazing to read the future is always fraught with challenges. What is known though is that there will be a new normal established on the sharing of the Indus waters, and Pakistan will have no choice but to accept the new normal if it intends to survive in the near future. Either way, the advantage card is held by India for now.
NOTE: The article has been written by Satyanveshi, the author’s preferred pen name. The author is an expert on Geopolitics and Energy Security.
