In a security environment increasingly defined by rapid response, airpower is indispensable to India’s strategic posture. The Indian Air Force (IAF), however, faces a dangerous capability deficit. While its sanctioned strength remains at 42 squadrons, a benchmark meant to deter simultaneous aggression from China and Pakistan, actual operational strength has dwindled to 31 squadrons and is poised to decline further.
The problem is not rooted merely in budgetary shortfalls or technological backwardness. Rather, the IAF’s modernisation crisis reflects deeper institutional dysfunctions: misaligned procurement priorities, fragmented research and development ecosystems, and an outdated industrial model. Unless India reforms these structures, it risks being outpaced by regional adversaries who have already transitioned to fifth-generation platforms and network-centric warfare.
India’s continued reference to the 42-squadron strength metric is based on Cold War-era threat models. The figure was institutionalised during post-1962 assessments and reflects a dated belief in numerical parity. Today’s air combat environment is defined not by absolute numbers but by relative capabilities, platform survivability, stealth, and real-time sensor fusion.
Indian Air Force vs China’s PLAAF
While the Indian Air Force fields primarily fourth and 4.5-generation aircraft, China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) already operates the fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighter and is developing additional advanced platforms. Pakistan’s air force, although more modest, is modernising through its partnership with China. Notably, earlier reports suggested Pakistan might acquire the J-35 stealth fighter by 2026. However, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif recently clarified that no such formal deal exists, offering India a reprieve but not altering the broader regional trajectory of stealth proliferation.
In this evolving context, a 42-squadron IAF made up of 4.5-generation fighters will remain inferior to a 35-squadron force equipped with fifth-generation capabilities integrated into a kill chain. India’s focus must shift from squadron count to qualitative overmatch.
The stalled modernisation of the Indian Air Force is best exemplified by the collapse of the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal. Originally envisioned in 2001, the tender for 126 fighters was cancelled after over a decade of delays, resulting in a stopgap purchase of 36 Rafales through a government-to-government agreement in 2015. The successor Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) program, launched in 2018, remains in bureaucratic limbo.
The reason behind the IAF’s Stagnation
This stagnation is the product of multiple cross-pressures: operational urgency from the IAF, the government’s insistence on local manufacturing under ‘Make in India,’ and political apprehension over allegations of impropriety. These pressures have paralysed decision-making. The result is a ten-year lag in force renewal, compounded by the absence of a clear industrial strategy.
The Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project aims to produce India’s first fifth-generation fighter. However, the program is behind schedule and lacks the indigenous propulsion capacity necessary for strategic autonomy. The Kaveri engine program, initiated in the 1980s, has yet to yield a viable product.
This failure is not purely technical. It stems from a confluence of structural constraints: insufficient funding, fragmented leadership, limited private-sector participation, and an ecosystem plagued by talent flight and institutional conservatism. Furthermore, technology denial regimes by key foreign suppliers, especially in propulsion, have restricted access to critical subsystems.
The dependence on foreign engines continues to limit even programs that are otherwise progressing. The Tejas Mk1A, while airframe-complete in several cases, remains grounded due to delays in receiving General Electric engines.
Indian Air Force and its chronic lack of integration
India’s defence-industrial complex suffers from a chronic lack of integration. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) operate in silos, often with overlapping mandates and no unified project execution authority.
Defence procurement continues to be handled by generalist bureaucrats with limited technical grounding. HAL’s delivery timelines are unpredictable, while DRDO’s project targets are rarely met. Even reform mechanisms like the Strategic Partnership Model have floundered due to a lack of financial clarity, cumbersome approval processes, and risk aversion.
| Metric | India (AMCA) |
China (J-20 / J-35) |
Pakistan (J-35) |
Türkiye (KAAN) |
UK-Japan (GCAP) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Generation | 5th (projected) | 5th (deployed) | 5th (2026) | 5th (prototype) | 6th (in development) |
| First Flight (Projected) |
2029 | 2011 / 2021 | – | 2024 | 2027 |
| IOC (Initial Operating Capability) |
2035+ | 2017 / 2025 | 2026 | 2028 | 2035 |
| Engine | Foreign (GE/Safran) | Indigenous | Chinese (import) | Foreign → Indigenous | Co-development |
| Program Type | Indigenous | Indigenous | Import | Indigenous | Trilateral |
This comparison underlines India’s structural lag. Every regional or aspirational peer is either operational or prototyping advanced fighters, while India is still laying design blueprints. The dependence on foreign propulsion, in particular, creates strategic vulnerability.
India’s defence budget, at approximately $78.5 billion, appears significant on paper but is deceptive in composition. Over 50% is allocated to pensions and salaries. The capital outlay for modernisation, especially R&D, is small and mostly tied up in legacy contracts. India dedicates less than 1% of its defence budget to innovation, compared to over 10% in technologically advanced militaries.
This imbalance locks India into a status quo force structure. Without reforms to financial prioritisation, including pension reform and direct R&D injection, the IAF’s modernisation will remain aspirational.
The urgent need for structural solutions
India’s fighter aviation crisis demands structural, not cosmetic, solutions. Procurement must be insulated from short-term political pressures and delegated to a standing professional agency. The AMCA must be elevated as a national strategic mission with dedicated authority and funding.
New aircraft acquisitions should follow transparent and time-bound paths, either through government-to-government deals for speed or competitive tenders with guaranteed terms. Crucially, propulsion must be treated as a sovereign capability: either through technology transfer in ongoing negotiations or by doubling down on indigenous development with measurable targets.
India’s industrial policy must pivot away from public-sector monopoly. Private firms must be integrated through long-term contracts and protected from policy volatility. HAL should focus on final assembly while component innovation is diversified.
Finally, India must engage selectively with sixth-generation fighter development programs such as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). Even if AMCA remains central, hedging through multilateral technological partnerships ensures that India is not left behind in the next generation of aerial warfare.
India’s airpower challenges are not born of ignorance, but of inertia. The country’s institutional ecosystem has failed to translate capability into combat readiness. The jet engine gap is not an abstraction; it is the most tangible symbol of a defence-industrial complex in crisis.
India must build what others will not sell. And it must do so not with slogans but with systems, not with hope but with hard policy. The strategic environment offers no grace period. As regional rivals scale new heights of aerial capability, India must choose between a future shaped by resolve or one defined by retreat.
In war, as in strategy, delay is often the most dangerous choice.
