Let me spin a theory that’s been rattling around in my head. Iran’s beef with Israel? It’s not organic. It’s not some ancient, blood-deep feud carved into the Persian soul. Iran chose this fight, hoisting the Palestinian cause like a banner, expecting the Middle East to rally behind it. Big mistake. The region didn’t fall in line, and by the time Iran realized it had miscalculated, it was too late to back out. And as is the nature of the game, Iran had to live with the choices it made; those choices have turned out to be a strategic blunder.
Iran’s real battles, where its influence should’ve been flexed, were elsewhere — Turkey to the northwest and Central Asia to the east. That’s where Persia’s historical anxieties have always lain, from the Greeks to the Ottomans, to the Mongols. Instead, Iran got suckered into playing Middle Eastern power games, believing it was the region’s natural heavyweight when, in truth, it’s more like India — a crucible of culture and history that should’ve hedged its bets. If Israel gets its way now, Iran as we know it might be staring at its endgame.
Let’s unload this for everyone’s benefit.
Picking up a wrong cause
Iran’s enmity with Israel feels less like a natural clash and more like a self-inflicted wound. Post-1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s new leadership needed a cause to cement its legitimacy. The Palestinian issue was low-hanging fruit — a ready-made rallying cry that resonated across the Muslim world. Iran figured it could seize the moral high ground, champion the Palestinians, and position itself as the Middle East’s moral and military vanguard. The math seemed simple: take up the anti-Israel mantle, and Arab states, along with the broader Muslim world, would fall in line, elevating Iran to regional hegemon.
Except, the math didn’t add up. The Arab states — Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf monarchies — probably saw through it. They viewed Iran’s move as a power grab cloaked in ideology, and instead of uniting behind Tehran, they doubled down on their own agendas, often aligning with the U.S. and, implicitly or explicitly, Israel. The other, very real reason was the Palestinian issue. From Jordan and Lebanon to Kuwait, Palestinians proved to be a domestic threat everywhere. Civil war (in Lebanon), assassination attempts on government heads (Jordan), picking sides against the host (Kuwait) to support an invader (Saddam Hussain), it was a messy experience for most Arab nations. As a result of all of these, Iran’s gamble backfired. It didn’t become the Middle East’s unifying force; it became its pariah.
By the time Iran realized it had misread the room, it was too deep into the anti-Israel rhetoric to pivot. The regime had staked its domestic legitimacy on this cause, arming proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas, funneling resources into a fight that wasn’t its own. Backing out would’ve meant losing face at home and abroad, so Iran doubled down, locking itself into a conflict that’s drained its resources and isolated it diplomatically.
This wasn’t just a tactical error — it was a strategic blunder. Yes, Iran gained some leverage through its “Shia Crescent” — Hezbollah’s clout in Lebanon and Assad’s survival in Syria gave Tehran a foothold in the Levant, keeping Israel and the U.S. on their toes. The 2006 Lebanon War, where Hezbollah bloodied Israel’s nose, earned Iran street cred in parts of the Arab world. But these gains came at a steep cost: billions spent on militias, crippling sanctions, and a Sunni Arab backlash that fuelled rivals like Saudi Arabia. Iran’s Middle Eastern adventure yielded tactical wins, but strategic losses kept mounting. All along they diverted Iran’s focus from more pressing threats closer to home.
They Forgot to focus on history
Where should Iran have focused instead? Look at its history, and the answer’s clear: the northwest and the east. Persia’s existential worries have always come from those directions. To the northwest, it’s been a parade of rivals — Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Ottomans, and now Turkey. The Persian-Ottoman rivalry shaped centuries of geopolitics, with both empires vying for Mesopotamia and the Caucasus. Today, Turkey’s neo-Ottoman flex under Erdogan — in Syria, Iraq, and cozying up to Azerbaijan — echoes that old tussle. Ankara’s backing of Azerbaijan in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War was a direct jab at Iran’s northwestern flank. A smart Iran would’ve poured its energy into countering Turkey’s ambitions, securing the Caucasus, not squandering resources in Gaza.
Then there’s the east. Persia’s eastern frontier has been a headache since the Mongols tore through. Central Asia — Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan — is Iran’s natural sphere, tied by language and culture. Yet Iran’s been asleep at the wheel. Russia rampaged during the Great Game. Today, China (and even Turkey!) has made gains. The Silk Road’s revival under China’s Belt and Road could’ve been Iran’s chance to project soft power, leveraging its position as a trade hub. Instead, it had remained distracted, funnelling billions into proxy wars while Central Asia slipped away. This is where Iran’s real game should’ve been played — building influence in Dushanbe and Tashkent, not Damascus and Beirut.
Middle East and A case of identity confusion
Why did Iran get this so wrong? It bought into the myth of itself as a Middle Eastern power. It’s not. Iran’s a crucible, like India — a civilizational state straddling multiple worlds. It’s Persian, not Arab; Shia, not Sunni. It is a bridge between the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. But unlike India, which has so far balanced ties with the U.S., Russia, and the Gulf while dodging regional quagmires, Iran faced tighter constraints. Sanctions, U.S. encirclement, and a Sunni-dominated region limited its wiggle room. Iran’s anti-Israel stance was partly a defensive reflex, a way to rally domestic support and counter American pressure through proxies. Still, it overcommitted, mistaking ideological zeal for strategic clarity, and failed to hedge its bets like a true crucible would.
Now, the chickens are coming home to roost. Israel’s been chipping away at Iran’s network — targeting proxies, striking nuclear facilities, and eroding its clout. If Israel’s campaign succeeds, Iran’s regime could face collapse, not just from external blows but from internal rot as well: economic decay and growing dissent. A fractured Iran risks losing its Middle Eastern foothold, its influence in Central Asia, and whatever little leverage it possessed against Turkey. The endgame could be a diminished state, hemmed in by rivals.
Parting observation on Middle East
Could Iran have avoided this? Absolutely! A shrewder, a more “Persian” Iran, I assume, would’ve played the long game, building alliances in Central Asia, countering Turkey, and minimizing its Arab-Israeli entanglement. It would’ve invested in its economic networks, not that of non-state actors, and positioned itself as the prime trading hub of the region. A Persian Iran would divert all its focus on not being a pariah. I guess Iran chose religious ideology over cultural identity, and now it’s paying the price.
In the end, Iran’s tragedy remains one of miscalculation. It saw itself as the Middle East’s saviour when it should have been its own. Like a chess player who sacrifices too many pieces for a fleeting check, Iran’s bold move has left it exposed. If Israel and its allies press their advantage, the board could be swept clean, and Iran as we know it might not survive the game.
