Picture this massive chessboard stretching from the misty mountains of the Caucasus to the turquoise waters of the Andaman Sea. On one side, the Russian bear with a penchant for springing sudden strategic surprises, is making bold moves in Myanmar’s Dawei Deep Sea Port and the Zangezur Corridor in Armenia. On the other, India, is walking the diplomatic tightrope, trying to juggle its historic friendship with Russia while being hopeful about establishing a reliable line with the US of A. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, with the hidden grin of a seasoned diplomat, hints towards dusting off the old Russia-India-China (RIC) playbook.
Is Russia hedging its bets in the Indian Ocean and beyond? Is this just another verse in the endless geopolitical ballad? Let us try to unspool this while keeping it lively, so that those among you who prefer sitcom can discover the one great drama that is global geopolitics.
The Dawei Drama: Russia’s New Beach House in Myanmar
Imagine Myanmar as a tropical hotspot where every global power wants a beachfront property. The Dawei Deep Sea Port, nestled in the Tanintharyi Region, is like prime piece of real estate, that’s been on the market for years. Thailand tried to renovate it but ran out of cash. And now it looks like Russia’s strolling in, eyeing the place for a strategic makeover. Myanmar’s junta chief, Min Aung Hlaing, personally approached Moscow to turn Dawei into a port for mega-ships over 200,000 tons. But let’s be honest here; it could be a good deal for Moscow too. Russia is squeezed by Western sanctions. Dawei could be its ticket to the Indian Ocean.

However, here’s the catch: the neighborhood is a mess. And that is speaking gently. The Arakan Army (AA), a rebel group with a lot of swagger and fan following, controls chunks of nearby Rakhine State. This is technically a threat to both China’s Kyaukphyu port and India’s Sittwe project. Though there are subtler relationships at play here between the trio, nonetheless – the AA is not the government; naturally, they cannot be considered a legitimate stakeholder yet.
At the other end, the US, ever eager to butt into the affairs of others – especially those that are far away from its home turf, is sniffing around the Arakan-controlled areas, whispering about humanitarian corridors through Bangladesh. This, as Uncle Sam keeps an eye on these different ports. China has already poured millions into Kyaukphyu to secure its Belt and Road dreams. India too, with its Sittwe port, has surfaced its ambitions to link its northeastern region to the Bay of Bengal.
Think of this as a reality show where everyone’s fighting for the best view; Russia’s Dawei bid is the latest plot twist.
The Zangezur Corridor: A Conundrum of Russian Proportion
Now, let’s get on our Mongolian horses and gallop about ten thousand kilometres from Southeast Asia straight across central Asian mainland to the South Caucasus – the strip between the Caspian and the Black Sea – where Zangezur Corridor is. This place is also causing more drama than your usual soap opera. This is a proposed route that is meant to connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave through Armenia’s Syunik Province, bypassing Iran.

Azerbaijan and Turkey are all in on this; they are dreaming of a trade superhighway linking Central Asia to Europe. Armenia, however, is clutching its sovereignty like a prized heirloom – absolutely unwilling to let its sworn enemy (Azerbaijan) take advantage of this kind. Iran is quite unhappy too. Because this corridor threatens to minimise the importance of Iran as a commercial transit hub. India is in the game as well; because this is a question of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which relies on Iran and Armenia to connect Mumbai to Moscow. As a result, it is siding with Armenia and Iran on this one.
So, what is Russia’s role, you ask? Well, imagine Russia as the DJ that is trying to keep the party going, but is not being perceived as a popular musician by half of the crowd. The Russian bear backs the Zangezur Corridor to stay chummy with Azerbaijan and Turkey. But this gambit is straining ties with Iran, its INSTC partner. The corridor’s a risky affair — if Azerbaijan and Turkey win, trade could shift away from Iran. This would also leave India’s INSTC dreams unfulfilled. This kind of an outcome is going to impact Russian ties with both Iran and India.
The Russian Hedging Game: A New Tune in the Indian Ocean?
The questions here are: Is Russia hedging its bets? That too by squeezing in, in the Indian Ocean region? Can the dots across the two extreme landscapes be connected?
Let us examine Russia’s investments in Pakistan — $14 billion in energy, a $2.5 billion gas pipeline, and $500 million in CASA-1000. This clearly shows that it is cozying up to New Delhi’s rival, despite their old bromance. Add this to the above two regions – Myanmar and south Caucasus, where India finds itself on the opposite side, and it definitely looks to me that Moscow’s presently spreading its chips across the board.
Why? Because the global flux is getting messier by the day, and Russia wants to examine options – never mind Turkey or Pakistan sending drones and weapons to the Ukrainians to fight Russia. The Western sanctions in play here are much bigger concerns than a few hundred dead Russian SMO operatives in the Ukrainian mud-slush. And if Moscow is to pivot towards east and away from Europe, then establishing relations with Pakistan, and control over the Indian Ocean is a glittering prize — more access to trade partners and routes means a louder voice in Asia.

India, meanwhile, walks the tightrope. Its S-400 deal with Russia and joint military exercises scream “besties forever,” but New Delhi’s also deals with the U.S. through QUAD and defence pacts. While Russian moves – in Pakistan, in Myanmar, and in south Caucasus – have reasons to make India nervous, India is savvy enough to not pick a fight. New Delhi knows that Russian investments in Pakistan are mostly economic; besides, Moscow has been careful to reassure India of its VIP status.
How?
Enter Sergei Lavrov, the diplomatic old hat, in a bid to reinforce the same. In his latest, Lavrov has hinted towards revival of the RIC framework. The RIC, born in the early 2000s, was meant to counter Western dominance, but it’s been gathering dust. Lavrov’s hint is strategic: if RIC is revived, Russia could hope to keep India from drifting too far into the U.S. camp. It is crucial, given the way Uncle Sam is eying the Myanmar ports. RIC revival could open up many possibilities including a Sino-Indian convergence of interests.
Connecting the Corridors and Ports
Dawei and Zangezur aren’t just about ports and corridors; they’re pieces of a global puzzle. The INSTC, India’s pet project with Russia and Iran, is a lifeline for trade from Mumbai to Europe. If Zangezur becomes a reality, that leaves Iran, Armenia, and India at a disadvantage. Russia understands this, but probably wants to move ahead nonetheless, putting its weight behind this corridor for its regional compulsions especially with respect to Caucasus, which remains its soft underbelly to this day – susceptible to Turkic influence through Islam.
In Myanmar too, Russia’s Dawei play could squeeze India’s Sittwe port on a normal day. Given the present circumstances, with the AA stirring the pot, Washington pushing Rohingya refugees through Yunus, and with China pushing the Junta as its pawn in the region – this is a geopolitical mosh pit where clearly, everyone is cheating. Under such conditions, the hint to revive RIC looks like Russia’s attempt to sweet-talk India into staying close, ensuring Moscow doesn’t lose its biggest Asian partner to the U.S.
The Road Ahead?
Russia’s hedging its bets but looks like it doesn’t want to ditch India. Lavrov’s RIC revival is a long shot. China and India aren’t exactly swapping friendship bracelets these days, but it is in the interest of the trio – Russia, India, and China – that they find common grounds. The RIC is a good platform for that. Because the US is too nosy to ignore, especially with their overtures to the AA in Myanmar. A humanitarian corridor, exchange of sufficient cash, and the AA could turn Dawei and Kyaukphyu into pipe dreams.
It is an extremely delicate affair. Across the other end in the Caucasus, this Armenia-Azerbaijan tension could boil over, making Zangezur a warzone rather than a corridor. As for Sergei Lavrov, he may or may not be chuckling at the chaos, but wants Russia to play the long game, keeping economy trade and influence in mind. But the apprehensions remain. Turkey is almost sure to include Islam in the mix, as would Bangladesh. Once that sets in, economy and trade take the backseat, whether it’s Dawei’s waves or Zangezur’s mountains.
In this little Great Game remix, the only certainty is that the chessboard’s never been this wild—or this entertaining.